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The article summarizes some preliminary 
results of the research project “Public Par-
ticipation in Environmentally and Socially 
Oriented Technological Policy: Philosophi-
cal Foundations and Institutional Frame-
works”.2 Arguments here are focused on 
energy policy in Russia. The main objective 
of the total project is to analyze normative, 
institutional and political problems of public 
involvement in technology policy-making 
by a comparison of experiences in Russia 
and EU countries. In the context of global 
energy problems and the corresponding 
debate the author identifies the chance that 
processes of social learning become 
‘transnational”. But on the other hand, the 
Russian experience shows the trend, that 
governmental actors try to control nongov-
ernmental organizations to a greater extent 
– a trend which is not productive for the 
establishment of bottom-up approaches. 
1 Introduction 
In 2006 for the first time Russia chaired G8, the 
elite club of industrialized countries. It was en-
ergy security that was proclaimed as the main 
topic of the Russian presidency. Undoubtedly, 
the security of energy supply is one of the most 
urgent problems for the global economy. As far 
as Russia is concerned, the energy problem is 
extremely important for both the economic and 
political development of Russia. It is also impor-
tant to keep in mind that in Russia discussions 
on energy issues have a rather long history. In 
addition and foremost, it is with the problem of 
energy that the first experience of public in-
volvement in decision-making processes in the 
field of technological and environmental policy 
is connected. Both the basic changes in the deci-
sion-making process in technological and envi-
ronmental policy, and the influence of the civil 
society on this process during the last two dec-
ades can be traced back on the example of dis-
cussions on energy. 
It is worth noting that in Russia, due to his-
torical reasons, this decision-making process 
still differs essentially from that in the European 
Union. The acceptance-oriented model can be 
considered as a standard model because it pre-
vails at present over other models of technologi-
cally and environmentally oriented policy-
making in the democratic developed countries. 
The strong and weak sides of the acceptance-
oriented model have been described in detail 
(Bechmann et al. 1994; Grunwald 2000); the 
convincing alternative allowing to overcome the 
disadvantages of acceptance-oriented decisions 
is also offered by Armin Grunwald (2000). In 
the case of Russia there is a more complicated 
and contradictory dynamics of decision-making 
whose starting point was the decision-making 
process under conditions of a totalitarian regime, 
where human beings, nature, science, technol-
ogy etc. are only means to achieve the political 
purposes of a ruling party, elite or leader. Ana-
lyzing this decision-making dynamics within the 
framework of rational choice theory would be at 
least one-sided. In my opinion, the tradition of 
political culture research taking into account the 
socio-cultural foundations of the political proc-
ess is more fruitful (Inglehart 1988). Socio-
cultural conditions represent the orienting 
framework for the participation of groups and 
actors in the decision-making process. Applying 
this approach together with concrete historical 
analysis allows to understand why during 20 
years after the Chernobyl accident the influence 
of civil society on decision-making processes on 
questions of technical and ecological policy has 
been so unstable. 
2 The Chernobyl Syndrome 
The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant on April 26th, 1986, became a turning point 
in the international discussion on the prospects 
of nuclear energy development. For the Soviet 
Union the Chernobyl accident had far-reaching 
economic, social psychological and political 
consequences. Wide public discussion of the 
reasons and circumstances of the Chernobyl 
accident coincided with the growth of civil ac-
tivity and the appearance of political opposition 
in the former USSR. Gorbachev’s radical oppo-
nents noted a system interrelation of the accident 
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of 26th April and the mechanism of decision-
making within the framework of a totalitarian 
system. ‘Systems interrelation’ means here that 
these opponents interpreted the highly central-
ized (top-down) model of decision-making in 
the field of nuclear energy in the Soviet Union 
and its totalitarian origin as an important pre-
condition of the Chernobyl accident. 
In connection with the Chernobyl accident 
the phenomenon of eco-nationalism came into 
being. It touched upon almost all republics of 
the former USSR (Dawson 1996). Its appear-
ance was caused by the system crisis of the So-
viet Union, the synergy of aggravated environ-
mental problems, the rise of national movements 
and the impossibility to rule using the former 
“command-administrative methods”. Eco-na-
tionalism was one of the symptoms and at the 
same time a new impulse for the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the gaining of inde-
pendence of its former united republics. For 
example, in Lithuania the attention of the public 
interested in environmental problems was pri-
marily concentrated on the operation of the nu-
clear power plant in Ignalina. Leaders of envi-
ronmentalist and nationalist movements pointed 
out that the recurrence of a nuclear power plant 
accident, comparable Chernobyl, would mean a 
national catastrophe for Lithuania. But it is 
worth noting that after Lithuania gained actual 
and legal independence in September 1991, the 
Ignalina nuclear power plant continued to oper-
ate, providing steady power supply for the coun-
try as well as electric power for export. The 
Lithuanian government had to return to the 
question of closing the Ignalina nuclear power 
plant only in connection with the accession of 
Lithuania to the European Union. 
In other parts of the Soviet Union only a 
few environmentalist groups were ready to have 
close organizational and political interaction 
with national movements in their republics. But 
still the environmental demands connected with 
the overcoming of consequences of the Cherno-
byl catastrophe, the termination of the construc-
tion of new reactors of the Chernobyl type and 
the achievement of real ecological publicity was 
actually supported by all the people affiliated 
with different political groups. No serious politi-
cal force in the Russian Federation, Byelorussia 
and the Ukraine, from supporters of independ-
ence to adherents of integrity of the united state, 
could ignore these demands. 
It is worth noting that the connection of na-
tional and ecological movements contributed to 
the fact that ecological problems became the 
political priorities of the central united govern-
ment in the last years of the USSR. At that time 
the necessity of comprehensive and anticipatory 
forecasts of economic, social, and ecological 
consequences of the development and wide 
industrial use of new technologies as well as the 
assessment of potential alternatives began to be 
considered as issue of the day. In particular, the 
USSR government made decisions aiming at the 
creation of a system of complex expert examina-
tion in the field of nuclear power engineering 
(Gorbachev 1995). However, the realization of 
these assignments and proposals did not result in 
the creation of organizations for Technology or 
Environmental Impact Assessment. In fact, on 
the threshold of the 1990s, the whole process of 
long-term decision-making in science and tech-
nology was blocked due to uncertainty concern-
ing the future of both the political regime and 
the economic system. 
The fall of single-party regimes and ideo-
logical dictate, the development of political 
pluralism, privatisation and diversification of 
economic activity etc. have led to a substantial 
transformation of the shape and contents of the 
policy-making process. Within the framework 
of the general process of political transforma-
tion the transition from the Soviet type model 
of “technocratic paternalism” to acceptance- 
oriented models is under way. This transition 
however was characterized by structural weak-
ness which only led to the formation of sepa-
rate, isolated institutional mechanisms of civil 
participation in corresponding decision-making 
processes. In particular, on the threshold of 
1980 to 1990 there was a fast growth of non-
governmental organizations, many of which 
were ecologically oriented and opposed the 
further development of nuclear power engi-
neering. In the middle of the 1990s, these struc-
tures of the civil society achieved a certain 
success: The adoption of the legislation on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in 1995 
should be mentioned here first of all. 
The first Russian experience of plebiscitary 
democracy in the field of energy policy was 
another success achieved by these structures. In 
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December 1996, a referendum was organised in 
the Kostroma region on the building of a nu-
clear power plant. The referendum was initi-
ated by the regional environmental NGO “In 
the Name of Life” and Greenpeace Russia. The 
preparatory campaign had a strongly pro-
nounced propagandist character on both sides – 
environmental NGOs and the Federal Ministry 
of Nuclear Energy, which managed the project. 
59 percent of voters in the region went to the 
polls; 88 percent of them said “No” to the nu-
clear power plant (Yablokov 1997, p. 168). As 
a result the project was stopped. Nevertheless 
this means in the terms of social learning that 
the Kostroma region is at present more ad-
vanced in understanding the risks of nuclear 
energy or environmental problems than other 
Russian regions. 
The case of the Kostroma referendum un-
derpins a number of analytical conclusions. 
First, it casts doubt on the so-called ‘ladder of 
civil participation’ introduced by Sherry Arn-
stein (Arnstein 1969). The highest level of this 
ladder is the citizen control which implies plebi-
scitary forms of democracy. But the referendum 
is a very controversial instrument. A referendum 
itself cannot be interpreted as the “best of the 
bests” within the repertory of participatory de-
mocracy. Even in Switzerland with its strong 
tradition of cantonal or federal plebiscites, the 
referenda on problems such as nuclear energy 
and genetic technologies revealed some short-
comings – over-politicization of the problem, 
polarisation of viewpoints, dominance of emo-
tions over rational argumentation, attempts of 
political parties burdening the discussion with 
additional issues etc. (Bütschi 2000). In Kos-
troma all these negative features of referenda 
revealed themselves. It is evident that such an 
event will not have any long-term positive effect 
without systematic efforts of civil society aim-
ing at a better life and a better environment. The 
characteristic feature of real progress of envi-
ronmental and technological policy-making is 
not formal bottom-up dynamics, but systematic 
participation of civil society based on using a 
broad range of instruments and procedures of 
decision-making. 
The Kostroma referendum became the ac-
me of public participation in decision-making in 
the field of energy policy, which was followed 
by a drastic recession of public interest in these 
problems. At that time the results of Gallup polls 
showed a steady decrease of the level of concern 
regarding environmental issues. For the period 
of 1994 to 1998 the figures showed a decrease 
between ten to 20 percent for various categories 
of people and different regions (Mokievsky 
2000). The effect of Chernobyl was exhausted. 
However there were also other circumstances 
which contributed to further changes in political 
decision making. The process of political deci-
sion making in the second half of the 1990s can 
be understood by leaving the unitary actor 
model. Corporative interests were in the fore-
ground at that stage of social and political de-
velopment in Russia. Domination of interests of 
financial groups and industrial corporations, 
most of which were related to the fuel and en-
ergy sector, could rather often be defined as the 
rule of New Russian oligarchs. As a matter of 
fact it emasculated the essence of democracy 
while retaining democratic procedures them-
selves. Traditional economic and social issues 
came up like poverty, social cleavages between 
the new economic elites, the governmental ac-
tors and the people with their actual concerns. 
3 Debates on the Kyoto Protocol: 
Discourse Transfer 
The debates on the ratification of the Kyoto 
protocol livened up public discussions on energy 
issues. These debates revealed the important 
phenomenon of transferring the combined dis-
courses of science, politics and society which 
under the conditions of globalization have gai-
ned importance in the international institutes, 
multilateral agreements, and also electronic 
mass-media. For Russia, the problems of global 
warming and how to cope with it became a 
“borrowed” discourse. Though the Russian rep-
resentatives took part in the negotiating process 
on problems of climate change on all stages, it 
was not Russia that struck the keynote of scien-
tific, public and political debates on global 
warming. In Russia, the problem of global 
warming remained at the periphery of public 
interest when heated debates were conducted in 
Europe and the USA. But when the Bush ad-
ministration refused to ratify the Kyoto protocol, 
its destiny fell into Russia’s hands, and the Rus-
sian government was confronted with the neces-
sity to make decisions within the framework of a 
political agenda formulated on the basis of an 
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“alien” discourse. No wonder that under these 
circumstances Russian decision-makers showed 
practically full indifference to the ecologically 
motivated arguments in favour of Kyoto. Only 
politic-economic arguments were efficient.3 The 
discussion about problems of climate change in 
Russia was promoted from outside, and it was 
rather top-down oriented – from decision mak-
ers and the community of experts to the civil 
society. On the whole, however, it was the first 
adequate national discussion on energy prob-
lems since the end of the 1980s. National mass-
media as well as numerous parliamentary and 
non-governmental hearings played an impor-
tant part in it. The result of the debate was 
paradoxical: the problems of climate change 
became the subject of public interest, but it was 
scepticism with respect to the Kyoto protocol 
which prevailed in public opinion. Neverthe-
less, the Russian decision makers decided to 
ratify the protocol. In outward appearance this 
decision seemed rather a backward step to-
wards technocratic paternalism. 
4 Inventing a New Discourse: 
Energy Superpower 
The change of the Kremlin government on the 
threshold of the year 2000 resulted in the radical 
change of character and structure of the political 
process during the first term of the presidency of 
Vladimir Putin. The state ceased to be only one 
of the actors of the decision-making process 
alongside with financial groups and fuel and 
energy corporations. The real control of the state 
over the key energy industries was restored and 
the new Russian oligarchic system of decision-
making was dismantled. The development of the 
energy sector, which comprises one-quarter of 
Russia’s GDP and one-third of industrial output, 
has furthered rather fast economic growth for 
the past eight years now. It is obviously caused 
by economic conjuncture, first of all, a steady 
trend of the rise in prices of energy carriers. 
Most likely, the steady rise of the prices of en-
ergy carriers is connected not only with the 
sharp growth of demand in countries such as 
China or India, but also with the fact that within 
the framework of the present-day techno-
economic paradigm, the cornerstone of which is 
still the use of hydrocarbon fuel as the main 
energy source, the solution of the problem of 
energy security has not yet been found. Al-
though during all these years many people have 
discussed the problem of excessive dependence 
of the economic development of Russia on the 
export of energy carriers and have warned of the 
danger thereof, among the representatives of the 
Russian political elite the belief is growing that 
the epoch of cheap oil and gas has become a 
thing of the past. In addition, Russia has a large 
potential in both, nuclear and hydro-power en-
gineering, as well as huge energy-saving poten-
tials, which have been insufficiently used so far. 
This fact strengthened the political elite’s confi-
dence in taking the dominance in the field of 
energy supply away from the Middle East and 
the Persian Gulf. 
It is a geopolitical accent that dominates in 
this new discourse now. Both, the problems of 
global energy security and tactical problems of 
the relations with the adjoining states are ac-
tively discussed. The discussion concerning the 
consequences of specific projects including 
those of the North European gas pipeline, the 
Pacific oil pipeline and the development of the 
oil and gas complexes of East Siberia and Rus-
sia’s Far East, is under way. Another matter of 
discussion is energy saving. Energy-saving pro-
jects based on the use of state-of-the-art tech-
nologies, processes and equipment have a very 
good potential, as they will help to develop ex-
port energy resources. Oftentimes, however, this 
will require adaptation to the Russian environ-
ment, including price conditions and buyer / 
consumer specifics (Arbatov, Belova, Feygin 
2006). In all these debates the participants have 
gradually focused their attention on the entire 
spectrum of technology policy options, from the 
introduction of routine technologies of energy 
efficiency in housing to the development of 
hydrogen power engineering. 
5 Also a Process of Social Learning 
Just as it was with the Kyoto protocol the de-
bates were initiated by top policy-makers and 
experts closely connected with them. Today, 
thanks to mass media the attention of wide 
sections of the population is attracted to these 
problems. It is possible to speak of the occur-
rence of a feedback between public opinion, 
the expert community and decision-makers, as 
well as the formation of some basic premises of 
a social learning process. On the whole, it cor-
responds to the bottom levels of Arnstein’s 
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‘ladder of civil participation’. At the same time 
the prospects of the evolution of structures for 
the participation of the civil society in the deci-
sion-making process are still unclear. In the 
Russian context, it is connected with the wish 
of governmental structures to control non-
governmental organizations to greater extent. 
In conclusion I would like to return to the 
international aspect of the problem in question. 
If we do not take into account the obviously 
competing geopolitical interests of the leading 
world players influencing the opposite orienta-
tion of debates concerning energy security of 
Russia and the EU, then in fact it is possible to 
speak of a new forum for the international dia-
logue of the public, experts and politicians, 
which does probably involve organized inter-
ests but not the general public and their organi-
zations in civil society. Within the framework 
of this dialogue there are good opportunities 
for the discussion of the whole spectrum of 
possible consequences of large energy projects 
and new energy technologies. On this account 
the process of social learning could become 
really transnational. 
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